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The place of the Constitution in American life nowhere appears more
clearly than in the form of our oaths of allegiance. These do not run to any
personal sovereign, or to any nation or government by name. They pledge
only the support of the Constitution of the United States, to which is some-
times added the promise to defend it against all enemies foreign and domestic.
It must be and it is something more than a mere document which is sanctified
by such oaths. It is the embodiment and symbol of nationhood, of a form of
government and of a way of life.
The document in which these things are enshrined has now been in
existence for more than a century and a half, in war and peace. It has survived
many crises; it has undergone amendments and additions, and the shelves
of many libraries are filled with writings and commentaries concerning it.
And yet constitutional questions still persist and controversies continue to
rage over the bearing of the Constitution on this or that set of facts.
In one of the articles in this Symposium the author (Mr. Curtis) speaks
of the Constitution as an "ambulatory document." As a figure of speech the
phrase is arresting. Yet the apparent movement is not so much in the Con-
stitution itself as in the changing circumstances to which it is to be applied.
There are changes, too, in the reasoning and sentiments of the men by whom
it is to be interpreted. But the movement, real or apparent, has its limits.
Innovation must halt, interpretation must pause, desire for change must be
put aside, at the boundary set by an oath to support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States. Protected by such an oath the Constitution re-
mains the Ark of the Covenant of our national life.
The Vanderbilt Law Review renders a distinct service in collecting and
publishing this symposium of articles on Current Constitutional Problems.
It is no part of a foreword to comment individually on these scholarly dis-
cussions by distinguished authors. It is enough to say that they are, each and
all, of high character; and the Student, the Bench and Bar, and the Layman
alike will profit by their perusal.
*Member, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl, New York, New York.
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COURT AND CONSTITUTION: THE PASSIVE PERIOD
BY JOHN P. FRANK*
We are at a mid-century mark in the Christian Era, and very little re-
moved from a mid-century mark in the life of the Constitution of the United
States and of the Court which is its principal expounder. We would not be
Americans-indeed perhaps we would not be human-if we did not see in
that concatenation of round numbers an invitation to stock taking. The essays
following in this symposium will take stock of particulars. We may therefore
begin with the extremely general: At these mid-century marks, what is the
relevance of the Court and the Constitution to American life?
To be general is not necessarily to be all inclusive. The inquiry is to the
consequences, the impact, the influence of the Court and the Constitution
(Court-Constitution) together. What the Court may do aside from interpreting
the Constitution, and the influence of the Constitution apart from the Court,
are not considered." The time period taken for immediate analysis is the four
years just closed, the period of the Vinson Chief Justiceship and the Truman
Court.
The affirmative influence of the Court and the Constitution on American
life since 1946 has been very little. ("Affirmative influence" means the con-
sequences of decisions actually made, as distinguished from the decisions
which might have been made, but weren't.) This is not to say that the Court-
Constitution's impact has been trivial. Even a dissenting Justice in a quiet
time is a more significant public figure than, for example, the typical first
term minority Congressman. A court of last resort, repeatedly interpreting
a constitution, necessarily has some influence. There is a minimum of effect
below which such a body with such a task can not fall. What is being said here
is that this influence is fairly close to minimum: that compared either with
the other contemporaneous institutions of government or with some past
Courts, the influence on the actual conduct of affairs is small.
To say that the Court's influence is slight is not to suggest that it ought to
be more. Whether a nonelective judiciary should be the dynamic force in a
democratic society is highly debatable. Many would prefer virtual total
judicial abdication to the judicial over-control of the Thirties. Others would
prefer a Court aggressive at least in the protection of human liberty. But the
debate on particular values may be left to the substantive essays which follow.
The argument here is that at various times in its history the Court-Constitu-
*Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. In the past four years, about half of the cases of greatest social importance have
involved statutory interpretation. An example of the significance of the Constitution wholly
apart from current judicial decisions is the contemporary debate over the powers of the
President in respect to the military disposition of troops.
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tion has had a sometimes more and sometimes less creative role in the
formulation of policy, and that the recent past has been a noncreative period.
There has been a vaguely conservative trend in the direction of the decisions,
but the Court for the most part has been a benevolent neutral, an onlooker
rather than a spirited participant in the controversies of the American scene.
2
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
There were 145 constitutional decisions in the four terms from October,
1946, to June, 1950. The two tables following give a quantitative breakdown.
Table I. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, 1946-50, iY POLITICAL CATEGORIES
Federal powers unrelated to civil rights ...................................... 8
State powers unrelated to civil rights ................. ....................... 15
Interstate relations ......................................................... 25
Federal-state relations ...................................................... 8
Criminal procedure .............. .......................................... 47
Civil rights unrelated to criminal procedure .................................. 19
Federal civil procedures:
a. Delegation problems ........................................ 5
b. Administrative law .......................................... 4
c. Eminent domain ............................................. 7
d. O ther ...................................................... 7
Total 23
Total 145
Certain facts-stand out. The exposition of the powers of Congress, at
times the raison d'etre of judicial review, has become, quantitatively at least,
an unimportant branch of the Court's work. The Court-Constitution are
primarily occupied with civil rights problems, half the cases being in criminal
procedure and other civil rights categories. Aside from civil rights, con-
troversies over the powers of the states over their own citizens (i.e., state
powers where interstate relations are not involved) are of small quantitative
moment. Next, quantitatively, after civil rights cases are intergovernmental
relations cases, particularly those involving burdens on commerce, full faith
and credit, and federal-state relations. The civil rights and intergovernmental
cases are 70% of the whole number.
2. Fuller accounts of each of the past four years than can be attempted here are
contained in the series, Frank, The Supreme Court at the 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 Terms,
in 15, 16, 17, and 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1 (1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 respectively).
These article will occasionally be cited below by the term dates, as 1946 Term Article
1, 25.
Because the instant essay wanders over so large an area, comprehensive citations will
not be attempted. The central theme of the article has been suggested by many others,
including Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE
L.J. 1319 (1941) ; and Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE LJ. 1469, 1473 (1948).
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Table II distributes the same group of 145 cases in terms of some of the
major interests of the American people during these four years.
Table II. CONSTITUTIONA I DECISIONS, 1946-1950, BY NATIONAL PROBLEMS CATEGORIES
Effective maintenance of democratic political processes .......................... 12
Racial and religious group relations ......................................... 10
Business regulations ......................................................... 18
Labor relations ............................................................. 9
General welfare (economic security, social legislation, conservation, housing) .... 9
Revenue problems .......................................................... 19
Techniques of government
a. Law enforcement ................................ . ...... 45
b. Other ..................................................... 7
Total 52
International relations
a. W ar ...................................................... 3
b. Peace ..................................................... 2
Total 5
Family relations ......................................................... 5
M iscellaneous ....................................................... ...... 6
Total 145
Table II shows a small sprinkling of litigation concerning many of the
great problems of our day. At the quantitative extremes, there is a large
volume of cases turning upon the adjustment of effective law enforcement
and civil liberty; and there are almost no cases directly concerned with inter-
national relations, now so largely preoccupying American attention.
Qualitative analysis of the decisions underlying Table II permits closer
estimate of the consequences of the Court's work.
1. Maintenance of Democratic Political Processes
The long shadow of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. lay even longer across
the land in the twilight of his life and after his death than in his prime. As
Holmes died physically, the bawdy humor and Lochner, the valiant moustaches
and Baldwin v. Missouri, the wound at Ball's Bluff and Abrams, "form your
battalions and fight" and Hammer v. Dagenhart-all blended into legend.
As the legend grew, and was embellished, and increased in popular acceptance
-and, most important, because the old man with the voice of youth did speak
for what is best in the American tradition and the American conscience-there
came to be fewer and fewer who were ready to take on the man and the
legend in a head-on fight.3
Holmes had been the voice of the freedom of our institutions. Pent up
law, like pent up water, seeks its path of least resistance. The recent years have
3. The task has recently been undertaken by that well-known expert in federal
practice and jurisprudence, Mr. W. Pegler, who has distorted the subject in at least
two columns. See, e.g., New Haven Register, Dec. 18, 1950, p. 14. For masterful analysis,
and, I think, destruction of more intelligent attacks on Holmes, see Howe, The Positivism
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1951).
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been years of repression in American life. The legal force of repression, un-
willing or unable to take on Holmes directly, has been washing around the
positions he held, moving toward goals he opposed, but seeking directions
which he never had occasion to study.
To say the same thing in another way, the people of the United States
between 1915 and 1930 evolved only the most primitive means of repressing
their dissenters. The spirit to repress was strong, particularly from 1917 to
1925, but ingenuity was limited to the simple device of putting dissenters in
jail. That was the problem with which Holmes (and Brandeis, of course)
dealt. Between them they worked out the clear and present danger test.
Holmes said that Benjamin Gitlow should not be put in jail for publishing his
"redundant discourse" because, "If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed
in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces
of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way."' 4 Brandeis, in the case of Miss Whit-
ney, said that persons should not go to jail for speech except where "im-
mediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the
past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then con-
templated." 5
Partly by putting a full time committee to work on the project, the
Congresses of the late 1930's and more recent years evolved more sophisticated
methods of achieving the same repressionist results which their predecessors
had sought. The more recent Congresses perceived that by striking at the
economic security of dissenters, enormously more widespread effects could
be obtained than by the simple device of jailing a tome-writer or a red-flag
waver.
The great, over-arching issue of the last four years (and of the im-
mediate future) has been whether the Court would (a) give Congress and
particularly the Un-American Committee bloc, its head in these experiments,
or (b) transfer the substance and spirit of the Holmes-Brandeis doctrines
to these new fronts. For the most part, in this period the Court has demon-
strated the aphorism that "courts love liberty most when it is under pressure
least."0
This result has not been achieved in any group of dramatic decisions.
That is the point. It has been the general tendency of a series of little leaks
in the Holmes-Brandeis dike:
Government employees.-As this is written, the Court has heard but
has not decided a flat challenge to the present practice of discharging govern-
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927).
6. A theme developed in Frank, 1949 Term Article 20.
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ment employees for "disloyalty" without due process of law. 7 It seems safe
to predict that the Court will reject this flat challenge, or escape it on some
jurisdictional ground; and that it will not hold that such persons are entitled
to the same due process of law when their careers and reputations are at
stake that would need to be accorded some petty offender with a ten-day jail
sentence in the offing.
The loyalty program gained great momentum four years ago when the
Court denied certiorari in a similar flat challenge." Subsequently, over strong
dissents, the Court has, on very technical grounds, refused to hold govern-
ment employees disqualified for jury service, even in "loyalty cases," though
it was vigorously argued that a government employee juror could not be
expected to cast a free vote when his own position might be prejudiced if his
dossier should show that he had voted to acquit a suspected person.Y
Labor itnion controk-In the Taft-Hartley Act, an innovating Congress
attacked dissenters in two new ways: (1) it used the commerce power for the
purpose; and (2) it substituted, in lieu of jail sentences on actual wrongdoers,
heavy burdens on labor unions which allowed undesirables to continue in
labor union offices.
In upholding the Taft-Hartley Act provision, the Court freed itself
from some of the force of the Holnes-Brandeis position by beginning its
discussion with the words, surely true, "The question with which we are
here faced is not the same one that Justices Holmes and Brandeis found
convenient to consider in terms of clear and present danger."'1 The clear and
present danger rule, said the Court, did not "lay down an absolutist test
measured in terms of danger to the Nation."" (What had Brandeis been
talking about when he spoke of "immediate serious violence?") Rather the
Court must weigh the effects of the speech against the evil, and, particularly
though not exclusively because "only a relative handful of persons" were
restricted, the Act was upheld.
The subject under analysis here is not the pros and cons of any particular
case, but rather the effect of the holding on the American scene. The Court
may have dramatic consequences whether by upholding or invalidating an
act. If the Act had been upheld on the theory of the concurring opinion of
Justice Jackson, the opinion would have been the most dramatic and con-
sequential of the 1940's; for the Jackson opinion, in the extent of its deference
to legislative will, opened the floodgates to almost any kind of restrictive
7. Bailey v. Richardson, No. 49, Oct. Term. 1950.
8. Friedman v. Schvellenbach, 330 U.S. 838, 67 Sup. Ct. 979, 91 L. Ed. 1285 (1947),
331 U.S. 865, 67 Sup. Ct. 1302, 91 L. Ed. 1870 (1947) (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
9. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 70 Sup. Ct. 519, 94 L. Ed. 734 (1950).
10. American Commufnications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396, 70 Sup. Ct. 674,
94 L. Ed. 925 (1950).
11. 339 U.S. at 397.
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legislation a legislature might pass.'2 If, at the opposite extreme, the Court
had upheld the position of Justice Black and invalidated the Act, the event
would have been equally dramatic; for Black contended that speech and
advocacy were immune to punishment except where "overt acts" arecom-
mitted by the individuals charged.
As it is, the Taft-Hartley case is the most important free speech
decision in the period under review. We may some day see that an era dates
from its decision. As it stands, however, we are still too close to it. The muddied
qualities of its distinctions of Holmes and Brandeis, its reiterations of some
of their concepts, mean that perhaps all the Court has done here is to acquiesce
in the will of Congress, neither stopping its course nor spurring it on.
Campaigns and elections.-In the past four years, the Court took up the
subject of proselyting by sound truck and put it down again; but it spoke in
so many voices, and with such confusing tongues, that the prerogatives of
this method of campaign by volume remain to be faced anew in the 1950's.13
The principal consequence of the first of the two decisions may well have been
the election of the present junior Senator from Tennessee.14
In recent years, Congress has enacted two measures aimed, one may
suspect, both toward purer elections and toward reducing the political sup-
port of New Dealers. The Hatch Act was directed at the 2% clubs, at
politicians subsidized on the federal payroll to do nothing but campaign, at
all the shabby tricks by which good government is subordinated to party wel-
fare. In its zeal it also reached almost every form of voluntary political
participation by the millions of government employees, precluding them from
"any active part in . . . political campaigns." Poole, an industrial worker in
the United States mint, violated the Act by working for his party at the
polls; Paris, a member of the Oklahoma State Highway Commission and
Democratic State Chairman, violated by organizing a "Victory Dinner."' 5
12. Justice Jackson, who had previously adhered to the view that Congress needed
more than a mere "rational basis" to restrict civil rights, West Va. State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), in this
case went all the way over to the opposite view, saying that the judiciary had no right
to review the "wisdom, effectiveness, or need for this legislation. Our 'inquiries, where
the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether
any state of facts, either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support
for it." American Communications case, 339 U.S. at 423, n.1. The Jackson turn-about
is the more startling because the passage quoted within his own quotation is taken from
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed.
1234 (1938). The famous Stone footnote to that passage, excepting civil liberties legisla-
tion from its scope, is now not mentioned.
13. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948), 2
VAND. L. REv. 113, holding that the right to use sound equipment could not be -left to
the unlimited discretion of an administrative official; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
69 Sup. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513 (1949). Who would be so assured as to attempt to reduce
the latter opinion to a half-sentence synopsis?
14. Senator Kefauver credits the Saia decision with contributing to his eventual
success in using sound equipment in Memphis.




The Hatch Act, in the most obvious way, is a restriction on freedom
of communication. A part of State Chairman Paris' offense was the introduc-
tion of the toastmaster at the dinner. The most significant theoretical aspect
of the case was that the Court, in approaching the problem, made no attempt
either to distinguish the clear and present danger test or to apply it. This
again, was not the problem Holmes and Brandeis had known and there was
apparently no need to consider it according to their lights.
In terms of practical consequences, it is not yet clear how effective the
Hatch Act will be. Its violations are so wide-spread, the subterfuges for its
evasion so easy, and the effort to enforce it so negligible that its immediate
effects are apparently not large.16
While the Hatch Act has many admirable features, in its less desirable
aspects it drives out of active political life millions of citizens who may
have a perfectly legitimate desire to be in it. So did the provision of the
Taft-Hartley Act restricting labor union political contributions. As Mr.
Justice Rutledge put it, concurring in the case considering that provision, the
"object was . . . to force unions as such entirely out of political activity,
including for presently pertinent purposes the expression of organized view-
points concerning matters affecting their vital interests at the most crucial
point where the expression would become effective."u 7 By somewhat forced
construction, a majority excluded union newspapers from the prohibitions
of the Act, leaving such newspapers free to exhort their readers concerning
political causes. The concurring Justices read the Act as covering the papers,
but as invalid for that reason. The resultant freedom for labor may have had
substantial effects on the 1948 political campaign.
One way to drain the vitality from the democratic process is to hamper
communication among voters. Another is to count the votes dishonestly.
In the American experience since 1787, the latter has probably been a more
frequent menace than the former. A variation of dishonest counting of the
votes, different morally but not practically, is gross maldistricting of the
voters. The vice common to both dishonest counts and maldistricting is that
by either method, a minority may prevail over a majority.
One hundred years ago the Court washed "political questions" out of its
jurisdiction.' s More recently, it has held that the problems of maldistricting
are "political questions." In this four-year period, it held to that position.19
In short, this may be one of the most serious problems of democracy; but it
is not one which the Court will assist in solving.
16. The Mitchell case is the only judicial decision reported in the Federal Code
Annotated on the Act.
17. United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 150, 66 Sup. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (1948).
18. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849).
19. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 Sup. Ct. 641, 94 L. Ed. 834 (1950) ; MacDougall
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 Sup. Ct. 1, 93 L. Ed. 3 (1948).
[ Voi,. 4
COURT AND CONSTITUTION
Summary, political processes.--The practical consequences of the de-
cisions, 1946-1950, concerning the political fundamentals of American
democracy may be listed thus: The loyalty program continues unhampered,
not materially affected by the few orders which have touched it. The control
of "subversion" by restriction of the economic opportunities of the subver-
sives was promoted by the most important opinion of recent years, that
sanctioning the elimination of Communists from labor union membership.
But the power to drive out of political life all with whom a dominant
faction disagree does not go unlimited; for by tight construction verging on
constitutional limitation, labor unions are left free to communicate with
their own members through their own press. Though the Hatch Act was
upheld in its farthest reaches, the remaining problems of campaigns and
elections before the Court, the problems of sound trucks and maldistricting,
were dealt with either inconclusively or not at all.
2. Group Relations (Race and Religion)
This was the foremost area of Supreme Court policy-making in the past
four years. Congress made the policies as to political processes, and the Court
merely echoed them; but in group relations, Congress, constantly urged to
act, never acted. The Executive" and the Court itself formulated and declared
the national policies.
In the midst of the War, the Court acquiesced in Congressional and
military treatment of Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans. 2 ' Sober second
sight made that treatment seem appalling to many Americans. 22 Since the
War, some Justices have flatly denounced racism in California, and the
Court as a whole has moved sharply against the continued application of race
distinctionis there. The alien land laws, barring Japanese aliens in our midst
from owning agricultural land in California, were constitutionally dis-
credited ;23 and the fishing limitations on the same group were invalidated
outright.
24
While filibusters have stopped racial equality legislation, they could not
block the racial equality movement in the executive and judicial departments.
Segregation has been tinder close Supreme Court scrutiny. A principal legal
device for geographic segregation, or the separation of the races by physical
20. Two of the outstanding documents produced in the executive department in this
period are, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, the Report of the President's Committee on Civil
Rights (1947); and FREEDOM TO SERVE, the Report of The President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (1950).
21. The leading case is Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375,
87 L. Ed. 1774 (1943).
22. See, e.g., Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
23. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948).




distances, has been the restrictive covenant, which has served as a paper
stockade around "little Harlems." The restrictive covenant cases20 make
those covenants unenforcable at law. While the decision will not by itself
greatly alter the housing situation for Negroes, it will probably have sub-
stantial effects in the long run; and in some "fringe areas," its effects have
already been felt.26
Segregation in education and in transportation were also markedly af-
fected by recent decisions. The decisions concerning the Texas and Oklahoma
graduate school programs foreshadow the end of "separate but equal" in the
higher reaches of education everywhere, 27 though their effects on primary and
secondary education are still uncertain. (It should be noted that if the Court's
first sound truck decision helped elect a Senator in Tennessee, as suggested
above, its segregation decisions contributed greatly to the defeat of an in-
cumbent Senator in North Carolina.)
28
A quantitative measure of the relative affirmative significance of the
three branches of government in race relations is of course impossible. Some
suggestion of the relative activity of each may be found in the index of the
current Negro Handbook, a reputable work which purports to summarize
in some detail "current, factual information [on] the status of the Negro
people in American life." The index contains a half column of entries on
"Supreme Court, United States," a quarter column on the activities of "Tru-
man, President Harry S.," and no entries at all on Congress.
Fully as important as the race group cases were the religious group cases.
The relationship between America's Catholic and Protestant populations,
though far less strained in these years than at many times in the past, are
always touchy.2 9 At no point in those relations is there more room for tangible
irritation than in education, for the Catholic duplicate of the public school
25. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), 2 VANID.
L. REv. 119.
26. Citations are collected in FRANK, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 951-52 (1950).
27. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 Sup. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 (1950) (educa-
tion); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 70 Sup. Ct. 851, 94 L. Ed. 1149 (1950)
(same) ; Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 Sup. Ct. 843, 94 L. Ed. 1302 (1950)
(transportation).
28. Accounts of the second North Carolina primary in 1950, in wlhich present Senator
Smith unseated then Senator Graham, attribute the result largely to the furor raised
over the decisions.
29. The tune changes, but the melody is the same. Consider this excerpt from the
Resolution of the American Republican Party, 1843, a New York nativist faction:
"That in the opinion of this party, based upon what appears to be very alarming fact,
papal power is directly opposed in its end and aim to a republican form of government,
inasmuch as the papist owes allegiance and fidelity to a power outside our government-
that is, to the Pope of Rome-and that power has been exercised in this city to such an
extent that our common school system, by party subserviency, has been bartered away
as a price for the votes of the organized followers of Bishop Hughes. Through this
school law there has been a preconceived determination, followed by an actual attempt
in the Fourth Ward, to put out of our schools the Protestant Bible, and to put down the




system is frequently illy regarded by Protestants, and is extremely expensive
to Catholics.
The two groups may have somewhat different demands on the public
school system. Protestants have desired to use the schools as a vehicle for
direct Protestant education; and at a minimum have sought direct approach
to the "captive audience" of school children. Catholic desires have rather
been for a sharing of public school funds.
Faced with one case on the use of public school busses for parochial
schools, and by another on the "release time" system, the Court was pre-
cipitated squarely into these controversies.3 It took an unequivocal position
that the First Amendment bars any significant or substantial aid to parochial
-education, and bars the Protestant "captive audience" technique as well. 31
If these decisions are made to stick, they will bulk large in the history of
religious relations in America.
3. Labor Relations
In the last decade, Congress and the state legislatures have passed a great
deal of restrictive labor legislation. The push toward such legislation, and the
resistance to it, has been one of the two or three dominant controversies of
the American scene.
The Court has been a participant in the making of labor policy, but in
a foreordained role. For the most part, it has had little to do but to inspect
the legislative product and, inevitably, certify it as constitutionally sound.
Unless the Court of the 40's were to repudiate everything done by the Court
of the 30's, there could be no great difference over the power of legislatures
to regulate closed shops or to control many other alleged abuses in labor
relations.
32
The Court's picketing decisions can not so lightly be dismissed. Some
thought that virtually unlimited constitutional protection to nonviolent picket-
ing had been given by the Thornhill case,33 in 1940, and subsequent holdings.
30. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461,
92 L. Ed. 648 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504,
91 L. Ed. 711 (1947).
31. There is room, of course, for endless qualification. For one of the excellent dis-
cussions see Symposium, Religion and the State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB, 1 (1949).
32. The Court found no difficulties in sustaining such legislation in Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern I. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 Sup. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212
(1948); American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538,
69 Sup. Ct. 258, 93 L. Ed. 222 (1948) ; and see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67
Sup. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed.'1877 (1947).
33. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940). The
general theme that "This Court has unequivocally stated time and time again that injury
which results to industrial concerns and to nonunion workers as a result of peaceful
picketing in labor disputes is not a substantive evil of such magnitude as to warrant
prohibition of picketing," is developed in Brief for Appellants, Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949). The brief is the best
exposition this writer has seen of the extreme position it takes.
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Any such interpretation of due process would nullify much of the antilabor
impulse. But it would take an extremely determined Court to use its power
thus, a Court which could somehow overcome the fact that the legal ma-
terials for such a purpose are neither historically in the Constitution nor in
the precedents. 34 Thornhill's case and subsequent decisions did not hold that
peaceful picketing .was beyond control, and labor lawyers who read the
cases contrariwise were reading their hopes into the opinions. Most of the
Court's recent decisions concerning restraints on picketing were as intel-
lectually inevitable as its decisions on anti-closed-shop legislation.3 5
The one enormous bit of judicial labor law and policy making was the
Lewis case.3 6 In that situation an Administration and a Congress then bankrupt
of a labor policy abdicated altogether, the Administration virtually asking the
Court to concoct some law which would surmount the fuel crisis. The Court
responded by supplying the Administration's need, and filling in where
Congress had declined to legislate.3 7 Most of the law then made was statutory
and procedural, an implied reservation being discovered in the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and some remarkable exceptions being found in a rule of
criminal procedure.38 The case well illustrates the subordination in importance
of constitutional to nonconstitutional issues, the only large constitutional
question in the case being a challenge to the size of the fine as a cruel and
34. The literature is omnipresent. One of the most stimulating analyses of the cases
pre-Giboney is Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing? 36 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1948).
35. Building Seryice Employers Int. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 Sup. Ct.
784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470, 70 Sup. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949). Reasons for thinking that the Hanke
case is a serious departure both from Thornhill and from common sense are briefly sug-
gested in Frank, 1949 Term Article 8-10.
A professor of Constitutional Law to whom this manuscript was submitted for
comment sent the following pungent observations: "I disagree with your observations on
the inevitability of some of the peaceful picketing decisions. It was not inevitable that the
Court should condone prior and subsequent restraints on peaceful picketing merely be-
cause a state court has declared the purpose of the picketing against the public policy of
the state. I can see no justification whatsoever for Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S.
460, 70 Sup. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950) [upholding an injunction against picketing of
a store by Negroes seeking an increase in the number of Negro clerks employed]. To
assume, as Justices Black and Minton did in special concurrence in that case, that the
mere citation of the Giboney decision somehow solves this quite unrelated problem seems
to me question begging, and a mere statement of conclusion. What would the Court
have done if the Negroes had been propagandizing a religious faith? I think that the
Court is hopelessly fuzzy and confused in its picketing cases."
36. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed.
884 (1947).
37. In May, 1946, the administration asked for legislation which would permit it to
break by injunction strikes which imperilled the public interest. The bill passed the House
but died in the Senate. H.R. 6578, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
38. The bill referred to in note 37 had made the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable
in such cases. The Court found that the Act was, at least in the special circumstances of
the coal situation, already inapplicable to the Government. Rule 42(b) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure gives an elaborate specification of the notice to which defendants
in criminal contempt proceedings are entitled. The rule was not complied with. The
majority was obliged to find this not prejudicial.
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unusual punishment. Needless to say, a Court which could overcome the
nonconstitutional obstacles to its result in this case had little difficulty with this
narrow Eighth Amendment question.
4. Regulation of Business
The Constitution made its mark as a significant factor in American life
as a restraint on the regulation of business. Dartmouth College, Gibbons v.
Ogden, Lochner v. New York, Hammer v. Dagenhart-these classics re-
strained governments. They are counterbalanced of course, and in some in-
stances overruled, by decisions which wrestled hard with the obstacles of
those decisions before waving governments ahead. 9
In recent years problems of business regulation have concerned the
American people at least as much as ever. We have just come through an
election in which, with the customary hyperbole of politics, the issues were
"socialism" versus "Wall Street tyranny."
In these disputes, the Court-Constitution have been largely observers.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act was upheld, but it was incon-
ceivable that it should not be.40 Otherwise there is scarcely a case worth men-
tioning as presenting a serious dispute of broad-gauge potentialities. 41 The
classic disputes over the commerce power, the contract clause and the due
process clauses were settled, for the time at least, in the late 30's and early
40's, and no one has stirred them up again. The people of Puerto Rico appealed
to due process for relief from their status at the bottom of our mercantile
sugar policy, but were summarily dismissed with the advice that due process
is dead.4 2 Two eminent domain decisions have some implications to public
power, 43 but there is no sign of the development under any clause either of
important new restraints or important new powers of government.
39. Compare Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed.
629 (1819) with Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231,
78 L. Ed. 413 (1934) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539,49 L. Ed.
937 (1905) with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81
L. Ed. 703 (1937) ; and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed.
1101 (1918) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609
(1941).
40. Electric Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 67 Sup. Ct. 133, 91 L. Ed. 103
(1946).
41. While there are 18 cases in this category, the bulk of them are of trifling social
significance. Examples are the cases on very small points of constitutional aspects of
administrative procedure, such as Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
67 Sup. Ct. 411, 91 L. Ed. 408 (1946) ; Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S.
29, 67 Sup. Ct. 1, 91 L. Ed. 22 (1946) ; Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR, 337
U.S. 265, 69 Sup. Ct. 1097, 93 L. Ed. 1353 (1949) ; and others.
42. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 70 Sup. Ct.
403, 94 L. Ed. 381 (1950).
43. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 70 Sup. Ct. 955, 94 L. Ed.
1231 (1950); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 70 Sup. Ct.
885, 94 L. Ed. 1277 (1950). The problems of these cases are briefly discussed in Frank,
1948 Term Article 13-18; and 1949 Term Article 14-18.
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5. Economic Security, Social Welfare, Housing and Conservation
The areas in this catch-all include some of the major interests of the
American people. "Full employment," "social security," and "valley au-
thorities" are among the commonest phrases in public discussion; and from
1946 to 1950 the single problem of obtaining adequate housing, at practicable
prices, has presented the most perplexing issue of life to an enormous number
of Americans.
These vital questions have scarcely been in the orbit of the Court-
Constitution. There have been a few details of rent control to settle, the most
important of which was the not unexpected decision that the program might
continue for a time after the cessation of hostilities.4" The Tidelands cases,
establishing national sovereignty over the minerals beneath the coastal waters,
are important and could have broad consequences in the conservation of oil.45
Important dicta in one decision make somewhat clearer than before the un-
impeded extent of the power of the federal government to develop river
valleys ;46 but while the opinion improves the logic of the subject, it leaves
the results about as they were before.
6. National and State Fiscal Policy
The important fact about the relation of the Court and the Constitution
to federal fiscal policy is the lack of relation. With the exception of the valida-
tion of the Renegotiation Act, discussed below in another connection, there
have been no decisions, important or unimportant, concerning the constitu-
tional power of the government to obtain its income. Federal financial policy
may involve some of the most important questions of our day, but they are not
constitutional questions.
47
The point at which the Court and the Constitution become involved in
financial problems is at the state level. Because one state's income-getting
44. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 178, 68 Sup. Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596
(1947). Other housing decisions include Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 Sup. Ct.
1552, 91 L. Ed. 2030 (1947); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 67 Sup. Ct. 1140, 91
L. Ed. 1368 (1947).
45. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 70 Sup. Ct. 914, 94 L. Ed. 1216 (1950);
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 70 Sup. Ct. 918, 94 L. Ed. 1221 (1950) ; United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947).
46. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 70 Sup. Ct. 955, 94
L. Ed. 1231 (1950). Other, almost trifling, social welfare problems arose in Goessart v.
Cleart, 335 U.S. 464, 69 Sup. Ct. 198, 93 L. Ed. 163 (1948) (legislation controlling
employment of barmaids); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69
Sup. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949) (limitation on truck advertising, allegedly for safety
purposes). Included in this category is Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S.
220, 69 Sup. Ct. 550, 93 L. Ed. 632 (1949), upholding a statute aimed at protecting the
poor from excessive funeral costs by separating burial insurance from the undertaking
business.
47. The most serious constitutional lispute over a federal revenue matter in the
last decade was Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed. 843 (1943),




activities may interfere with the prerogatives of citizens of other states, the
Court of necessity deals with state taxes.
If the Court were divided into administrative, divisions, as it is not, we
might assume that the state tax cases of recent years had been sent to the
"Chaos Division" rather than to the "Tax Planning Division," if such there
were. Bodies of constitutional doctrine seldom spring in full perfection from
the judicial brain in any short period of time. A writer describing the scope
of the contract clause in 1830 would have had a difficult task. So also with a
writer on due process in 1904, or a writer on the federal commerce power in
1935. One writing in 1951 on the commerce clause as a limitation on the
state taxing power can only note that while in 1971 it may prove possible to
wrap up the subject in a neat package, it is not today.48
Basically the modem Court thinks that any given state tax problem is
unimportant: "revenue serves as well no matter what its source."4 9 Because
the Court regards the problem as of no great importance, it can luxuriate in
the niceties of verbal distinctions, ignoring the actual incidence of a tax, and
letting results depend upon the way the taxing act is worded.50
The result is that while there have been a substantial number of state
tax cases in the past four years, their direction has not been sufficiently con-
sistent to have had marked revenue consequences. On the one hand, no im-
portant new doors have been pushed open for the tax gatherer to enter; there
has been no vast issue decided such as the validity or invalidity of state sales
taxes on goods purchased from interstate commerce.8 1 Justice Rutledge did
offer a basically new formula for the distribution of state taxing powers; but
it remained a one-man remedy and may have disappeared altogether with his
death. 2
On the other hand, there was no decision which completely shut doors
on the tax gatherer. The general effect of the Court's decisions is probably to
strengthen the appeal to state revenue officials of sales taxes, and the Court
has thus to a slight extent put its weight on the side of the most regressive
form of taxation in the transactions field. There is, however, no evidence
48. This is not a prediction. Of all the basic, recurrent constitutional problems before
the Court fairly constantly from the beginning, there is historically less clarity on this
one than any other. With a record of 125 years of false starts and circular reasonings,
the extent of the commerce clause as a state limitation is very probably doomed to remain
an everlasting puzzle.
49. The phrase is Justice Frankfurter's in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253,
67 Sup. Ct. 274, 91 L. Ed. 265 (1947), and has been rephrased by Professor Dunham as
"Let them eat cake." Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47
COL. L. REv. 211, 216 (1947).
50. Compare Freeman v. Hewit, supra note 49, with International Harvester Co. v.
Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 67 Sup. Ct. 444, 91 L. Ed. 390 (1947).
51. In other words, there was during this period nothing really fundamental, like
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 Sup. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed.
565 (1940), the definitive discussion of sales taxes.
52. In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 91 L. Ed. 265 (1947),
Justice Rutledge proposed a system for apportionment of taxes on interstate transactions.
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that any state has fundamentally changed its tax program because of the
decisions.m
7. Techniques of Govervnent
One third of the constitutional cases of the past four years have sought
to achieve the elusive goal of effective law enforcement without sacrifice of
individual liberty. When all the cases are put together the effect is to leave the
general practices of law enforcement almost, though not quite, as they were
before the cases were decided.
It is in this body of law that the Court's sophistication becomes the worst
enemy of its effectiveness. In criminal procedure, the Court is making the
law of the billy club and of the trial court. That law must be simple and plain
if it is not to be ignored.
Take, for example, the question of the right to counsel. When the Court
swings a broadsword, and asserts that all persons charged with capital offenses
in state courts and all federal defendants must have counsel or their convic-
tions will be reversedZ 4 the rule can be understood, obeyed and enforced.
When, as in the case of noncapital offenses in state courts, the right to counsel
depends upon a melange of factors such as defendant's age, degree of educa-
tion, knowledge of English, nature of the offense and previous courtroom
experience 5 as well as the degree of respect of the Supreme Court for the
particular state judge involved,56 state trial judges conclude by conducting
themselves about as they would if they were subject to no instructions at
all.57 Many of the cases of the past four years have simply added to the mist
which surrounds the right to counsel.58
53. The text is worked cautiously in terms of "no evidence that," because of the
difficulty of knowing what moves the mind of the tax assessor. In Indiana, a prime
victim of gross income tax decisions, the first impulse among responsible leaders was
to give up and switch to the sales tax; but that state finally determined to avoid, if
possible, the force of Freeman v. Hewit by interpreting it so narrowly in its tax regula-
tions as to reduce to negligible effect. Note, 53 IND. L.J. 252 (1947).
54. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) ; Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).
55. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 Sup. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948) ; Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 Sup. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942) ; and similar cases.
56. Professor Freund offers the perfectly appalling, though completely justified,
speculation: "One may be permitted to wonder whether the decision in Belts v. Brady,
holding the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in state courts not
to be an invariable constitutional requirement, would have been the same had the opinion
of the court below been written by someone less highly esteemed than Chief Judge Bond
of Maryland, who is referred to by name in Mr. Justice Robert's opinion no less than
fifteen times." FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THIE SUPREE CouRT 79 (1949). Could the
ingenuity of man devise a more senseless method of trial administration than that of
letting trial court rights be affected by the chance of which appellate judge may later
happen to be assigned the case on appeal, and upon the later chance of the attitude the
Supreme Court may take toward that judge?
57. This is hard to demonstrate, giving the usual problems of proving a negative.
If there have been any fundamental changes in practice in any jurisdiction concerning
the right to counsel, I and several persons consulted are unaware of them. The Court has,
however, had greater effect in forcing post-trial review procedures, particularly in
Illinois; the material is summarized with citations, Frank, 1948 Term Article 29-30.
58. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 Sup. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 1948)
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On no subject have the Court's wheels spun more with less progress
than in searches and seizures. At the beginning of the period, Harris v. United
States 59 appeared to open the way to a vast new freedom to the police to
search without warrants. Trupiano v. United StatesO0 to an appreciable extent
then undid the Harris case; and at the end of the period Rabinowitz v. United
States overruled Trupiano, leaving the Court about where it was when the
period began. 01
In the hegira from Harris to Rabinowitz, doctrine marched a circle in
three cases, with a few way stops. In Wolf v. Colorado,62 the Court made a
similar trip all in one case. The issues were (a) whether the states were
bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to observe the principles of the Fourth
Amendment in respect to searches and seizures, and (b) if so, whether
evidence illegally seized by state police was admissible in state proceedings.
Under the federal practice, the Fourth Amendment is protected by the non-
admissibility rule, without which, as Justice Holmes put it, the Amendment
is merely a "form of words." In the Wolf case, the Court held that the state
"could not" indulge in illegal searches and seizures, except that if they did,
the products of their illegal searches were admissible in evidence! It is un-
likely that any policeman will change his practices in any way as a result of
such a decision.
The Court has walked a straighter line in the forced confession cases,
though it seems safe to predict that the course of that line is due for funda-
mental change. Frequently by 5-4 margins, and with multiple divisions in the
majority, the Court has ordered reversals where suspicious confessions were
entered . 3 This course had been vigorously resisted by a bloc of four which,
while it of course does not approve of confessions obtained by violence, does
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 Sup. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948) ; Bute v. Illinois,
333 U.S. 640, 68 Sup. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S.
145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1711, 91 L. Ed. 1962 (1947) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed. 1955 (1947) are some of the more interesting.
59. 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947), 1 VAND. L. REv. 60.
60. 334 U.S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REV. 116.
For one of the several excellent reviews of this subject see Reynard, Freedom from Un-
reasonable Searches, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
61. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950).
One cannot with assurance restate the Harris rule, but it seems to be a holding that a
varrantless search in connection with an arrest can search into every part of or object
in a man's home, and that a resultant seizure of property will be valid where the
possession of the property is in itself a crime. Trupiano in effect undercut this by holding
that warrapts must be obtained when there was opportunity to obtain them; and
Rabinowitz, while overruling that holding, very carefully reached its own result on
conventional grounds and did not attempt to invoke the farther reaches of the Harris
doctrine.
62. 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
63. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1947) ; and see the




not feel the same emotional repugnance to such confessions as did the
majority. 4
There are no known statistics as to whether third degree practices are
on the wane. The replacement of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in any case
makes it probable that the Court will largely abandon its efforts to control
this practice; and it may even reverse the decisions which had construed the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to handicap the related practice of
detention incommunicado. 5
8. International Relations
The great questions of peace or of war in all the shades of temperature
in which it has become fashionable to refer to them are largely entrusted by
the Constitution to the branches of the Government other than the Court.
In an era in which the gravest questions confronting the country have been
how to make the peace after the last War, and how far to be involved in the
next one, the Court has had five war-born cases. While at least four are
of considerable importance, they are certainly far removed from the most
vital areas.
Two of the cases concern wartime procurement. Two days after Pearl
Harbor, the Court heard argument in the Bethlehem Steel case.00 The decision
of that case soon after was of profound importance to procurement, because
it precipitated Congress into the use of the device of "renegotiation" as one of
the controls of war profits. Because Congress was precipitated into that pro-
gram, and compelled to act almost without thought, the original Renegotiation
Acts of 1942 were slovenly in their standards of delegation of power and,
for a few months of their coverage, were retroictive.67 In Lichter v. United
States,8 decided in the four-year period immediately under consideration, the
Court upheld the early Acts against the charge of unconstitutional delegation
64. A good exposition of this view is the opinion of Justice Jackson in the Watts
case, supra note 63.
65. The most recent such case is Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct.
170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948), a 5-4 decision which looks ephemeral indeed. "The most
important fact about the five criminal procedure cases, four of which were decided
against the defendant, was that in four of the five, the certioraris were granted last
year ... In other words, the former Court had an interest in criminal procedure ...
Since January 1, 1950, certiorari has been granted in only two cases involving con-
stitutional aspects of criminal law. It seems safe to predict that this branch of the law
will for a time be swept under the rug of certiorari denied." Frank, 1949 Term Article
25 (1950) ; and see Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 99
U. OF PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
66. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 62 Sup. Ct. 581, 86 L. Ed.
855 (1942), which upheld a judgment for Bethlehem under World War I contracts in
such terms as to make very clear that if the Government wished to avoid excessive
profiteering in World War II, it must move at once.
67. The first Act did not define "excessive profits" at all. An amendment a few months
later added the following jewel to legal literature: "The term 'excessive profits' means
any amount of a contract or subcontract price which is found as a result of renegotiation
to represent excessive profits." 56 STAT. 982 (1942).
68. 334 U.S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 1294, 92 L. Ed. 1694 (1948).
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and of violation, by retroactivity, of the principles against impairment of
contracts. The decisions on the vital points were by no means open and
shut, and the Lichter case is thus as important as renegotiation itself for the
few months period of 1942 principally involved. Since a more carefully drawn
statute should in any case have been valid, the significance of Lichter for the
future is comparatively little. Another decision important to war procurement
was the holding that property condemned by the government in war time
should be valued by courts with a close eye on. the prevailing price control
standards, thus reducing the likelihood that price control might be weakened
by refusals to sell goods to the government except at prices over ceiling levels.6 9
A principal novelty of the peacemaking process after World'War II was
the large scale trial and punishment by the victors of captured enemies. Some
of these trials have been conducted by American military commissions, some
by international tribunals. Public opinion in the United States has divided
very sharply on the general principles of this method of peacemaking, which
to some is vindication of the principles of justice, and to others a reversion
to barbaric practices of executing captured enemies after displaying them in
a triumph.70 Public opinion has also been sharply divided on the merits of
particular cases.
71
These are exciting issues; but the Court left resolution of them entirely
to others (unless a refusal to take jurisdiction is to be construed more af-
firmatively as oblique approval of the post-War practices). The disposition of
the captured enemy thus was made, by jurisdictional decision, into a type of
"political question." 72
9. Family Relations
The Court can do comparatively little about the disintegration of the
fabric of the family in America. But because divorce can, and often does,
involve more states than one, the Court has the responsibility of working out
the rules by which persons may know whether they are or are not married
as they move about the country.
The Truman Court inherited the simple question, "married or single?"
in an impossible mess. The rules were in such complete confusion that per-
sons married in one state and divorced in another had no way of knowing
69. United States v. Commodities Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 70 Sup. Ct. 547, 94 L. Ed.
707 (1950).
70. Enthusiastic about the Nuremberg trials: JAcxsoN, THE NUREMEERG CASE
(1946). Critical: Ireland, Ex Post Facto Frome Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEmPLE L.Q. 27
(1947).
71. See, e.g., REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHrrA (1949).




whether they faced freedom and possible improved marital bliss, or jail for
either desertion or bigamy.73
One of the real triumphs of the Truman Court has been its start toward
introduction of workable clarity into this situation. The new rules may or
may not be good ones, but they are at least comprehensible. If the parties
agree and collaborate, they can obtain an effective out-of-state divorce, at
least as between themselves.74 If they do not agree, and only one seeks the
divorce, that party acts at his peril. The effect of collaborative divorces on
third parties is currently in dispute.75
The Court has thus put its weight in behalf of making marriage a
consenual status.
10. The Total
If an historian were to do a one-volume study of American life in the
1940's, he might very well omit any reference to the Court-Constitution,
1946-1950. But if that historian had the breadth of vision to perceive that the
marble pillars and white pile behind the capitol could hide treasure for his
discovering, he might mention the segregation and the church-and-state cases.
If his hobby were social history, lie would write of marriage and divorce, and
hence perhaps of the divorce cases. If his interests were predominantly in
business regulation, social welfare programs or international relations, he
would pass the marble palace by. If, like other decade historians Allen, the
Beards and Slosson, he were concerned with human liberty, the clerk might
advise him to come back in a term or two.
II. THE POTENTIAL
The small consequence of the Court-Constitution, 1946-1950, was a
matter of the choice of the Justices, rather than their necessity. The docket
turned up opportunities which, had the Court chosen, might have resulted
in striking developments, and this without absurd stretchings of doctrine.70
73. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942),
as confused by Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed.
1577 (1945).
74. The leading cases are Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087, 92
L. Ed. 1429 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451 (1948).
Other family law cases of the period are Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 69 Sup. Ct. 751,
93 L. Ed. 957 (1949) ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561
(1948) ; Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 Sup. Ct. 903, 91 L. Ed. 1133 (1947).
75. As this article is completed, Johnson v. Muelberger, No. 296, Oct. Term 1950,
involving the effect of a quickie divorce on third parties, has been argued but not decided.
For summary of argument before the Court see 19 U.S.L. WEEic 3187-89 (1951). [In an
opionion rendered March 12, 1951 (71 Sup. Ct. 474), the Court held that the divorce is not
subject to collateral attack by third parties in other states if it cannot be so attacked in
the state where rendered.]
76. This goes only to the cases which the Court chose to hear. The possibilities for
action were quantitatively far, far greater among the cases on which certiorari was denied.
See Harper and Rosenthal, supra note 65.
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For examples: (1) If Adamson v. California77 had been decided as
the minority seemed to desire, the states would have been required to conform
all of their criminal and perhaps some of their civil procedures to the standards
of the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the Constitution itself would have needed
amendment to permit small claims courts to continue to function without
juries. (2) The Hatch Act cases78 might have reached their same result on the
theory that Congress had unlimited right to condition continuity in govern-
ment employment on absolutely any basis it chose, thus putting the entire
loyalty program outside the scope of judicial review; or it might have been
decided the other way, and the rights of government employees upheld on
grounds so broad that the loyalty program would almost automatically have
been invalid.
(3) United States v. Petrillo,9 and other labor cases, might conceivably
have held that interferences with strikes for any purposes can not be allowed
either under the Thirteenth Amendment or the First Amendment, thus
neutralizing antilabor legislation. Or the Court might have upheld the Act
there involved on far broader grounds, so as almost to invite new restrictions.
(4) The Lewis case8 ° could have reached its result on a theory of absolute
presidential power to obtain injunctions in emergencies (a possibility which
would have seemed too bizarre to mention here except that Justice Clark, as
Attorney General, apparently subscribed to it) ;81 or the Court might have
held for Lewis on the ground that the punishment was excessive, or on some
other ground, and thus might have precipitated more extreme legislation
than any yet passed.
(5) In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Conm'n,s the Court might have
upheld California's legislation against fishing by resident Japanese, and thus
encouraged anti-Japanese measures on the West Coast; in Oyama v. Cali-
fornia 3 it might have done the same in respect to Japanese landholding. On
the other hand in both these cases it could have gone farther in putting
Japanese on a plane of equality with all other "persons" in the United States.
(6) In Bute v. Illinois,84 and similar cases, the Court might have
extended the right to counsel to all criminal defendants in state courts. (7)
In United States v. C.I.O.,8s if the Court had upheld the Taft-Hartley Act's
restrictions on labor publications with political messages, the Congress would
77. 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947), holding that California
need not, at least in the circumstances of the case, afford criminal defendants a privilege
against self-incrimination.
78. Supra notes 15 and 16, and text.
79. Supra note 32.
80. Supra note 36, and text.
81. Statement, Attorney General Clark, New York Times, Feb. 3, 1949, p. 1.
82. Supra note 24.
83. Supra note 23.
84. Supra note 55.
85. Supra note 17.
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doubtless have proceeded to go still further to reduce the effective participa-
tion of labor in national life. (8) In the sound-truck cases, if the Court had
either unequivocally immunized these machines from any control except
that of volume, or had given the communities a completely free hand to sup-
press them altogether, it would materially have affected the methods of political
campaigning in the United States.s (9) If in the various cases involving mal-
districting in elections the Court had intervened to enforce equality among
voters, the control of some state governments as well as the distribution of
membership in Congress might have been markedly affectedsT (10) Ter-
miniello v. Chicago8 8 might have been decided for the city on the ground that
police have a right to arrest speakers who insist on giving addresses in the
presence of mobs which will commit violence if the speech is heard. Such a
precedent could have been a long move toward making the institution of
"protective custody" common.
(11) The Puerto Rican sugar case89 could have been decided on the
giound that the United States may not exploit voteless territories for the
economic benefit of the mainland. If 'such a principle had ever been worked
into our fundamental law, Puerto Rico would have infinitely more hope for
its economic future than is now warranted.
(12) If the minority views had been adopted in the case challenging the
trial of a group of Germans by, an American military commission, it would
have been the law that the "mandate of equal justice under law should be
applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only
over thirteen colonies. ... [O]ur courts [could] exercise [habeas corpus]
whenever any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any
land we govern."90 If that view had prevailed, America might actually have
exported democratic institutions as an aftermath of military victory!
The cases mentioned are only a sampling. The difference between the
passive quality of most of the Court's deeds, and the dynamic quality of its
opportunities illustrates that the Court-Constitution could, if so minded, have
exercised far greater influence on American life than they did. It illustrates
also the limits of the Court's potential. Assuming that it had taken every
opportunity for action which came before it, it could not even attempt to offer
a solution to many of the perplexities of Americans. There was nothing of very
great significance which the Court might have done, no matter what its desires,
in the fields of business regulation; economic security; housing (unless it
86. Supra note 13.
87. Supra note 19, and text.
88. 337 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949). But see Feiner v. New York,
71 Sup. Ct. 303 (1951).
89. Supra note 42.
90. Eisentrager v. Johnson, 339 U.S. 763, 798, 70 Sup. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950)
(dissent of Justice Black).
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had invalidated rent control); national fiscal policy; stabilization of the
institution of the family; or, with the limited exceptions mentioned, war and
peace.
III. FRom TANEY TO TRUMAN
The relevance of the Court-Constitution to American life varies from
time to time. It would be misleading to compare the years 1946-1950 with a
four-year span deliberately chosen for the very reason of its special excite-
ment. 1946-1950 in the life of the Court-Constitution was certainly placid if
compared with 1934 to 1938, with its Old Deal dying and its New Deal
being born.
But some sense of proportion is obtained by comparing the quadrennium
1946-50 with four other four year periods, chosen solely because they are
spaced at 25 year intervals before the current time. The resulting time units
(1846-50, 1871-75, 1896-1900, 1921-25) have in common that each stands in
close proximity to a war (Admiral Farragut's suit for prize money for storm-
ing Mobile Bay and Admiral Dewey's for taking Manila fall in the 1871-75
and 1896-1900 periods respectively), 91 with war or post-war issues decided
in each. 2 There is particularly marked similarity in the eminent domain
disputes wars bring.93 Each period except that of the Mexican War presented
serious questions concerning rights of aliens, and particularly Orientals. 94
But the differences are more striking than the similarities.
91. United States v. Farragut, 22 Wall. 406, 22 L. Ed. 879 (1875) ; Dewey v. United
States, 178 U.S. 510, 20 Sup. Ct 981, 44 L. Ed. 1170 (1900).
92. 1876-80: White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 20 L. Ed. 685 (1872) (effect of pre-
emancipation contracts concerning slaves); Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, 20 L.
Ed. 689 (1872) (similar) ; Delman v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661, 20 L. Ed.
757 (1872) (effect of contracts for payment in Confederate money) ; Pierce v. Carskadon,
16 Wall. 234, 21 L. Ed. 276 (1873) (effect of statute putting "pains and penalties" on
Confederates) ; Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276, 22 L. Ed.
871 (1875) (power of Union general in New Orleans).
1896-1900: The major post-Spanish War cases of course did not come up so early;
but the Court did have wartime revenue cases involving constitutional issues: Nicol v.
Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 45 L. Ed. 786 (1899); Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969. (1900) ; Plumber v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 20 Sup.
Ct. 829, 44 L. Ed. 998 (1900).
1921-1925: Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed.
595 (1922) (validity of rent control); and see Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,- 264 U.S.
543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924).
93. Military procurement problems: United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, 20 L. Ed.
474 (1871) (compensation for steamboats pressed into service) ; Russell Motor Car Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 43 Sup. Ct. 428, 67 L. Ed. 778 (1923) (damages for
cancellation of contract) ; United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 43 Sup.
Ct. 565, 67 L. Ed. 1014 (1923) (effect of "market value" on price government must pay
for coal under highly inflationary circumstances) ; United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 70 Sup. Ct. 547, 94 L. Ed. 707 (1950) (effect of price ceilings on
"just compensation").
94. A year after the 1871-1875 period the Court decided Chi Lung v. Freeman, 92
U.S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550 (1876), invalidating a remarkable California statute under which
a state immigration officer was enabled to determine, apparently by a glance, that Chinese
immigrants were "lewd and debauched women," subject to certain penalties. In United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890 (1898), the Court
announced the profoundly important decision that children born in the United States of
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First, the quantitative differences:
Table III. NUMBER or CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, FIVE PERIODS"
1946-1950 .......................................................... 145
1946 ..................... 34 ..............................
1947 ..................... 42 ..............................






















The differences of substance are more illuminating. The earlier discussion
in this essay has surveyed the major cases of the past four years. They may be
compared with the squibs which follow:
1. 1846-1849. The constitutional decisions of 100 years ago were short
on quantity but, with due regard for the limited nature of governmental
alien Chinese parents were themselves citizens. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938 (1922), is a leading case on the rights of aliens to hearing
before deportation. Other deportation problems arose in United States ex rcl. Bilumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221 (1923) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.
32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, 68 L. Ed. 549 (1924). Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 Sup.
Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 44 Sup. Ct. 21, 68 L.
Ed. 278 (1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 44 Sup. Ct. 112, 68 L. Ed. 318 (1923),
and related cases were the leading decisions upholding California's restrictions on
Japanese land-holding-until they were distinguished away to the point of being overruled
in the two cases of the recent period. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct. 269,
92 L. Ed. 249 (1948) ; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138,
92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948).
95. For the three most recent periods, each date represents the October term. The
system of -sitting in October was inaugurated in 1873, and therefore for 1871 and 1872,
the cases studied were those which, without reference to term name, were decided be-
tween October and the rising of the Court the next spring. For the 1846-1849 period,
calendar years were studied.
For an unusually interesting comparison of Then and Now, see Lowry, The Supreme
Court it; 1848 and 1948: A Review of Two Terms, 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 459 (1950).
Mr. Lowry presents the thesis that the Jackson, Van Buren, Polk appointments were
"outside the spoils system," while the Roosevelt appointments were part of "the patronage
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activities at that time, they were long on significance. Waring v. Clarke6 and
New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank97 are two decisions
which revolutionized the scope of the law of admiralty. West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix,98 equally with the Charles River Bridge case9 9 of a few years before,
sets the foundation for the modern law of the contract clause. Luther v.
Borden'00 needs no panegyric. The License Cases'0' and the Passenger
Cases'02 were the most voluminous constitutional decisions of the period; and
their present day significance is largely lost due principally to the fact that two
terms after this period the Court decided Cooley v. Board of Wardens'0 3 and
began its modern career as watchman of the freedom of interstate boundaries.
2. 1871-1875. After the Civil War the negative side of the commerce
clause and the contract clause furnished the largest quantitative bases of
constitutional decisions, about 20% of the cases falling in each of these
categories. The Court was also mopping up after the War, deciding what to
do about contracts for slaves; considering contracts payable in Confederate
money; upholding an application of the Civil War income tax; and reaffirming
the national power to establish military courts in the South.
104
Just before the beginning of this period, the Court had decided Knox
v. Lee, 105 finally upholding the legal tender acts. The most important decision
within the four years was the Slaughterhouse Cases.10 6
3. 1896-1900. In this period the negative implication and contract clause
cases were each about 10% of the Court's constitutional business. These were
the formative years for due process of law. Allgeyer v. Louisiana0 7 began the
bizarre career of liberty of contract, though Holden v. Hardy0 8 at the same
idea." I believe, on the contrary, that a more political and more meritless run of the
appointments never occurred than between Taney (1835) and Curtis (1851). But Mr.
Lowry's article is provocative and illuminating.
96. 5 How. 441, 12 L. Ed. 226 (1847).
97. 6 How. 344, 12 L. Ed. 465 (1848). The first case greatly increased the tort,
and the latter the contract, jurisdiction of admiralty.
98. 6 How. 507, 12 L. Ed. 535 (1848), holding that some sovereign powers cannot
be contracted away, and that therefore, if a state made a contract involving one of
those powers, its subsequent abrogation did not violate the contract clause.
99. 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. Ed. 773 (1837).
100. 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849), holding the determination of the legitimate
government of Rhode Island to be a political question.
101. 5 How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256 (1847).
102. 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849). These two decisions defy brief summary; but
for a time they pointed in the direction that the Court should not review the validity of
state laws affecting commerce.
103. 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).
104. These cases are collected in note 92, supra.
105. 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871).
106. 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). These cases, too, defy capsulated statement.
Arising in the context of a dispute over the power of the City of New Orleans to grant a
slaughtering monopoly, they narrowly construed the 13th and 14th Amendments and
virtually read the privileges and immunities clause out of the 14th Amendment.
107. 165 U.S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832 (1897), holding invalid a state in-
surance regulation on the theory of interference with liberty of contract.
108. 169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898), upholding a Utah hours of
labor regulatien against the contention of interference with liberty of contract.
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time laid the stumbling block over which that notion eventually fell back into
oblivion. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago'01 brought state
eminent domain proceedings at least theoretically under federal supervision.
Smyth v. Ames"0 began the course of "fair value" in utility rate regulation.
These years saw about as many constitutional decisions as 1946-1950.
Some of them were trifling, as the dispute over-the power of New Orleans
to designate a red light area."' But some of them, for the first time in the
eras under study, required interpretations of the federal commerce power.
The Trans-Missouri Freight case112 and the Addyston Pipe & Steel case11
are noted examples arising from the Sherman Act.
A new grist of civil rights business also appears for the first time on the
Court's docket. One case presented almost the same issue as a 1946-1950 case;
each challenged the legality of an execution of a person who became insane
after conviction.1 4 Cases of more general interest arose over the claimed right
to speak on the village green ;115 the status of Orientals born in this country ;l1
rights of Negroes to jury service;11? school segregation ;118 and whether the
states are bound by the criminal procedure sections of the Bill of Rights.119
The latter three of these issues were, in only slightly different shapes, again
up for consideration in the last four years.' 20
4. 1921-1925. In this four-year period, both the volume and the im-
portance of the cases decided far outstripped the period 1946-1950. The volume
was 50% more. The largest groups were the negative implication cases, about
10%o of the whole number; and the due process cases having to do with
109. 166 U.S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897), holding state court judg-
ment as to amount of valuation subject to review under due process. I NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN c.4 (esp. p. 313) (3d ed., Sackman & Van Brunt, 1950).
110. 169 U.S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
111. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 'U.S. 587, 20 Sup. Ct. 788, 44 L. Ed. 899 (1900).
112. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540,
41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897).
113. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 20 Ct. 96, 44
L. Ed. 136 (1899).
114. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 94 L. Ed. 604 (1950) ; Nobles
v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 Sup. Ct. 87, 42 L. Ed. 515 (1897). The Solesbec case follows
the Nobles case, and both arose from situations in Georgia.
115. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. Ed. 71 (1897), virtually
overruled by Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939).
116. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890
(1898).
117. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 18 Sup. Ct- 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012 (1898);
ef. e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1947) (also a
Mississippi case).
118. Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262
(1899); cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 Sup. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 (1950).
119. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 622 (1900) (jury
trial) ; cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947)
(accused's privilege not to testify).
120. See cases cited, notes 114-19, supra. The Court also confronted the religious
establishment problem in both periods. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 Sup. Ct.
121, 44 L. Ed. 168 (1899) (payment to hospital of religious order) ; and Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 648 (1948).
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business regulation and rates, about 20%o of the whole number. The contract
clause cases, though substantial in number, were fewer proportionately than
in previous years.
The great cases of these years were Truax v. Corrigan;12 1 Stafford v.
Wallace; 2 2 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.; 2 3 Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 24
and Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair; 25 Balzac v. Puerto Rico; 26 Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon; 127 Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Conrn'n,'128 and Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States;120
Massachusetts v. Mellon;130 Adkins v. Children's Hospital;'3' and Charles
Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations.
3 2
There were famous civil liberties decisions, too. Basic rights of aliens,
38
fair trial in state courts, 3 4 freedom of speech in relation to states,' 35 and
foreign languages in the schools were among the topics reviewed. 36 In this
era of normalcy in the White House and Teapot Dome on the Hill, the Court
was by far the most creative institution of American government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The voice of man is the voice of his experiences, and the Constitution
speaks through the voice of a majority of nine men. The great traumatic ex-
perience of the life time of those men, in relation to the Constitution, was the
excess of judicial supervision of American affairs before 1937. Vinson, Black
and Minton were in Congress at the time of the Court fight; Reed was at the
121. 257 U.S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254 (1921) (restrictions on injunctions
in labor disputes).
122. 258 U.S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735 (1922) (extension of commerce
power to stockyards).
123. 259 U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922) (the child labor tax case).
124. 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup, Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595 (1922).
125. 264 U.S. 543, 44 Supk Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924). These are World War I
rent control cases.
126. 258 U.S. 298, 42 Sup. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922) (a leading modem case
on territorial status).
127. 260 U.S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922) (validity of regulations
relating to preservation of surface structures jeopardized by coal mining).
128. 262 U.S. 276, 48 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 (1923).
129. 263 U.S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169, 68 L. Ed. 388 (1924). These are the leading rate
cases.
130. 262 U.S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923) (concerning the standing
of taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures).
131. '261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed; 785 (1923) (invalidity of minimum wage
legislation for women).
132. 262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103 (1923) (reviewing state compulsory
arbitration statute).
133. See particularly the Japanese cases for the period cited, in note 94, supra.
134. There were numerous cases of this sort, one of the best known being Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543 (1923), a case in which a lynching
atmosphere penetrated the trial court room.
135. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925)
(alleged state denial of free speech held subject to review under 14th Amendment).
136. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923).
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heart of the Administration's struggle; and Frankfurter, Douglas and Jack-
son were very close to it.
But while reaction against McReynolds-ism accounts for some of the
modern apathy of the Constitution, it by no means accounts for it all. The
effects of the Court fight are different on different Justices. That experience
has contributed to Justice Minton's dominating urge to stick close to the
precedents, leaving so nearly as he can the "making of law" to the other
branches of government. On the other hand, Justice Black stood with Minton
in 1937. Today he would restrict the judicial hands-off policy to those economic
areas wlhich precipitated the earlier struggle; at the same time he wants a
Constitution endlessly dynamic in the protection of civil liberty. So (toes
Justice Douglas. Justice Frankfurter is a leading constitutional "non-actionist,"
a philosophy which, one may suspect, is drawn both from a lifetime of con-
templation of the futility of judging, and from a personal instinct to avoid any
form of concrete action as well.
However we account for it, the Court-Constitution is at the moment,
and perhaps only for the moment, an institution of dwindling significance in
American life. This is so whether the measure is quantitative or qualitative,
in comparison with earlier years. It is particularly so when the measure is
relative to the other institutions of the federal government. John Marshall
wrote a fairly small number of profoundly significant constitutional decisions;
but the Congresses and Presidents of 1801 to 1835 had almost insignificant
participation in the daily lives of Americans as compared with President Tru-
man and the 80th and 81st Congresses. As government generally more and
more moves in on American life, the Court-Constitution more and more
move out.
It would take at least the aggressiveness of a Marshall to keep the Court
in the relative status in government which he gave it, and even then the task
might prove impossible. For the very reason of the vast expanse in the
activities of the Federal Government, today's Court is overwhelmed as Mar-
shall's was not by sheer volume; the Court finds itself institutionally incapable
of bringing into obedience to its commands a single bulk-producing agency
such as the Patent Office.
This essay is a report. It is not meant as applause or criticism. But more
than either, it is not meant as a requiem. There is power latent in passivity.
A half-century passed between the first two great exercises of judicial review
of acts of Congress. If, between 21larbury v. Madison and Dred Scott (say, in
1850), a commentator had predicted that the Court and the Constitution had
no important future in American life, he would have been reasonable; but he
would have been wrong.
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